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Abstract
Heads of households appear to misperceive their own household income.
This misperception of income can be easily aasessed, but also asks for some
adjustment of the answers to subjective questions where household incomeserves as a frame oí reference. The appropriate extent of adjustment can beestimated. However, it seems more natural to explain the unadjusted answers
directly by both misperceived income and accurately measured income. Theresu]ts show that adjustment of the answer to the so-called Minimum Income
Question proportionate to the income misperception, as advocated by Kapteynet al. (1988), causes an overestimation of the related Subjective Poverty Linefor a one-person household and less pronounced household composition effects.
The results, from estimated correction and in the case of direct use of misper-ceived income, are similar.
'The author thanks Peter Kooreman, Arie Kapteyn and Bertrand Melenberg for their invaluablecomments. Ruud Mutíels took care oC the Statutory Poverty Line levels that appear in Table V.The Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics kindly released the data Cor publication.
1 Introduction
Empirical evidence indicates that respondents misperceive their own household after
tax income (See Kapteyn et al., 1988). R,espondents appear to underestimate their
household after tax income. As will be explained below, this underestimation turns
out to have a downwards biasing effect on the subjective poverty line in empirical
implementation. In Kapteyn et al. (1988), a method is presented to remedy this bias.
One can adjust the responses to subjective questions if these questions are preceded
by a question which measures the respondent's perception of his household after tax
income. The misperception of income can be calculated from a comparison of the
respondent's perception of the income with the measurement of income as the sum
of a lengthy list of components. Next the responses to the subjective questions can
be corrected. An alternative is of course to avoid the misperception, by prefacing the
subjective questions with the detailed questions about household income components.
Here, the focus is on the former case.
Kapteyn et al. (19S8) assume that the answers to the subjective questions are
biased in the same proportion as income is underestimated by the respondent. In
this note, this assumption is tested within the context of the so-called Subjective
Poverty Line (SPL). (See Goedhart et al., 1977). Section 2 concisely introduces the
SPL concept. Section 3 presents the adjustment procedure as proposed in Kapteyn
et al. (1988) and indicates how their assumption can be empirically relaxedl. An
alternative assumption is also given through more direct use of the measurement of
the respondent's perception of income in explaining subjective answers. Section 4
contains the estimation results. For comparison the same specification as in Kapteyn
et al. (1988) is adopted. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Subjective Poverty Line
The SPL was introduced in Goedhart et al. (1977). It is called `Subjective' because
it springs from the respondents' answers to a survey question, the Minimum Income
Question (A1IQ). The `IIQ runs as follows:
~~hich after tax income for your household do you, in your circumstances,
consider to be absolutely minimal? That is to say that with less you could
not make both ends meet.
The 14IQ answer, given by the head of household n, is referred to as the respondent's
minimum income ymin,n.
The SPL is operationalized by specifying a relation between ymin,n on the one
hand and household income and a vector of household characteristics on the other
hand. To facilitate comparison, the SPL equation will initially be specified as in
~This was suggested by a referee of Kapteyn et al. (1988).
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Kapteyn et al. (1988):
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composition of household n
household after tax income
mean ]n income in the reference group of household n
mean household composition in the reference group of household n
error term
(1)
Household composition is specified such that account is taken of both the number of
persons in the household and their ages:
J.~
Jcn - 1-~ ln Jsn -f f(ai) ~ ~Í(ai)]n(J~J - 1)
j-2
where
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where a; refers to the age of person j and ryz and ry3 are parameters to be estimated.
From equation ( 1), ym~n,n can be written as a function of yn, for given values of the
other variables on the RHS, as set out in Figure 1. The MIQ answers are aggregated
into the SPL by the following reasoning. Suppose one obtains an income to the right
O{ y:n;n n in Figure 1. Take the corresponding minimum income level and return it
as income. Through an iterated habituation process that person will end up in the
fixed point of the function set out in Figure 1. The SPL is defined by this fixed point
of that function, ymm,n~ which equals
exp oo ~-
a~(1 - az)Ícn -~ ( 1 - az)mn - cxl(1 - az)hcn - W'(1 - az)hc„mn (3)
(1 - ~2)(1 - ~Ícn)
The income level ym;n is the point where a household can just make both ends meet.
Eventually, a household is not able to manage with less income and with more income






FIGURE 1: The Subjective Poverty Line y;,~;n
3 Adjusting for pownward Bias
In the definition of the SPL, the respondent's income appears to be a crucial variable.
So it is important to know which estimate of his own household income the respondent
has in mind when answering the 11ZIQ. If the respondent underestimates this income,
it is likely that he will also underestimate y,n;n,n. As mentioned before, the factor of
downward bias can be calculated from comparison between the respondent's estimate
of income and a more accurate measurement of income. Just before the MIQ in the
survey, the respondent's perception of his household after tax income is measured by
the following question where the respondent can choose out of seven income brackets:
Can you indicate roughly what the total after tax income of your house-
hold has been during the past 12 months? Less than Dfl. 17, 500; 17, 500-
20,000; 20,000 - 24,000; 24,000 - 28,000; 28,000 - 34,000; 34,000 -
43, 000; 43, 000 or more.
Table I reflects the underestimation of household income.
In order to analyze the systematic difference in Table I between the results from
the two income measures, Kapteyn et al. postulate the following relation between
income y;,, the answer to the income question in brackets, and the income components
yn; (i - 1, ..., I) recorded at the end of the questionnaire
f 1 ev~
















TABLE I: COMPARISON OF TWO INCOME IVIEASURES
Income Bracket Average Income 1Vb
~ 17,500 17,201 564
17,500 - 20,000 25,085 355
20,000 - 24,000 28,690 521
24,000 - 28,000 32,128 632
28,000 - 34,000 38,305 635
34,000 - 43,000 45,412 686
~ 43,000 65,006 6gg
DH. per year. The second column gives the average income of
all households in the corresponding income bracket according to
the detailed measurement of income. N~ heads the number of
respondents in the income bracket. SEP Oct86.
where the Q;'s are parameters to be estimated and r~n is a normally distributed errorterm with mean zero and variance a?. The values of ~; are expected to lie in the unitinterval [O,1J. The smaller a parameter Q;, the more the respondents `forget' the ithincome component in response to the income question in brackets. The parametersQ; and o~ can be estimated by means of maximum likelihood.
Denote the factor of underestimation by gn. The parameters ~i; being estimated,this factor can be evaluated as gn -~! ~ yn;~ ~; ~(j;yn;, Kapteyn et al. now assumethat the respondent underestimates his minimum income ym;n,n by the same propor-tion as his current income yn. It is however not entirely obvious why the adjustmentof ym;n should be proportionate to the underestimation of y, for in equation (1) yminand y are not linearly related. Moreover it appears that the extent to which ym;nshould be corrected, can be estimated. After substituting the adjusted value ymin,n9~for ymin,ni equation (1) becomes
In ymin,n --ó In gn t ao f at (1 -~z)Jcn -f- ~(1 - a:z)Ïcn ln yn f az In yn
f(1 - ~z)mn - al(1 - Q~)hCn - t~(1 - ~Z)hG~mn f en (5)
where ó indicates the extent of adjustment. Note that ó is identified so that it ispossible to test whether proportional adjustment is appropriate, i.e. ó- 1 vs. ó~ 1.From equation (1) readily an alternative specification suggests itself. In the re-sponse to the 114IQ, income serves as a frame of reference. This is represented by ln ynin equation (1). However, ln y;, seems a more natural candidate to capture this frameof reference, or perhaps a combination of In yn and ln y~ is best. So the alternativespecification reads
4
ln ymin.n - a0 -~ Q1(I - Q~)fCn ~ (~(1 - Qy)fCn ~ QY)((I - .`) ln yn ~ ~ ]n yn)
-~(1 - ~1)mn - ~1(1 - a:~)hCn - t~i(I - Qz)hcmm~ f En (6)
The equations (5) and ( 6) are identical iEingn -!n yn-ln y;, and Á- a(r(~(1-az) fc„ faz). For equation (5), ln ymin,n f ó lIIgn 19 SllbBtltllted fOr ln ymin,n in equation (1) and
for equation (6), ln yn in equation ( 1) is replaced by (1-a) ln ynfa]n y;,. In estimation,
eyuation (6) results in special cases of equation (5). The concurrences are tabulated
in terms of 6 and a in Table III.
TABLE II: CONCURRING SPECIFICATIONS
ó a
0 p
.1(t~i(1 - n~)fcn f az) .~
~G(1 - crz)f~„ -f az 1
ó -
1 -
In the next section, the estimation results are given for both equation (5) and (6).
Assuming that En and ti7n are independent and follow a normal distribution the pa-
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where en - En f ór~n, ~ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function and




The data are from the October 1986 wave of the Social Economic Panel survey
conducted by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. Table III lists the income
components distinguished, y,,;.
TABLE III: INCOME COMPONENTS
Head of household's wages, salaries, benefita
Head of household's fringe benefits
Rent subsidies
Household allowances
Profits, employer's contribution to health insurance premiums, scholarships
Head of household's other income
Spouse's income
Eldest child's income









Table IV presents the estimation results for equations (4) and (5). The estimated
parameters ~3; indicate that the head of household's wages etc. appear to be re-
called almost completely. Components like incomes of children and other household
members, rent subsidies and head of household's other income are often forgotten.
Clearly, the hypothesis ó- 1 has to be rejected. A striking result is that ó- 0
performs even better than b- 1. The three columns in the middle do not manifest
much within difference. The estimation result a~ 1 is difficult to interpret. At a
high significance leve] (Xi;o.oi - 6.63) however, the restriction J1 - 1 holds, which
signifies that only income as perceived by the head of the household, yn, is the frame
of reference ~vhen completing the survey.
To compare the results between the columns in Table IV, Figure 2 presents the
five corresponding age functions j(age) and Table IV exhibits the implied poverty
lines íor various household composítions. The poverty lines have been computed with
m„ and hs„ set equal to their sample means.
Except for ó- 0, the age functions look rather similar. Although the age functions
sho~v a dip, the poverty lines in Table V rise when household size in number of persons
increases. Household size in number of persons compensates the age dips below zero.
For ó- 1, i.e. overadjustment of lnym;,,,,, according to Table IV, the poverty line for
a one-person household appears to be overestimated with respect to ë unrestricted.
Similarly the economies of scale are overestimated in this case.
Just for comparison the last column of Table V contains the levels of the statu-
tory poverty line for the selected household compositions. The levels are based on the
Social Assistance Act and include holiday and family allowances. The steeper house-
hold composition compensation dces offset the lower starting level of a one-person
6
TABLE IV: ESTIMATION R.ESULTS EQUATIONS (4) AND (5)
6 0 .`(t~i(1- ctz) fcn f az) 0.40(0.02) 1
a 0 1.11(0.05) 1 - -
~o -0.43(0.03) -0.38(0.01) -0.39(0.01) -0.38(0.01) -0.30(0.01)á, 3.88(0.78) -0.12(0.25) -0.13(0.25) 0.48(0.32) -2.00(0.21)áz 0.54(0.04) 0.34(0.03) 0.35(0.03) 0.39(0.03) 0.29(0.04)
7~ 0.05(0.01) 0.03(0.01) 0.03(0.01) 0.03(0.01) 0.03(0.01)
73 -1.1U-3 -1~1U-3 -1r1U-3 -1~1U-3 -1s10-3
(3~10'') (2.10-') (3~10'') (3~10-') (2~10-')
~ -0.35(0.07) 0.03(0.02) 0.03(0.02) -0.03(0.03) 0.21(0.02)Q, o.sl(o.ol) o.sl(o.ol) o.so(o.ol) o.so(o.ol) o.so(o.ol)
Qz 0.95(0.07) 0.77(0.06) 0.78(0.06) 0.79(0.06) 0.84(0.04)
Q3 0.39(0.08) 0.42(0.08) 0.41(0.08) 0.42(0.08) 0.63(0.08)
Q4 0.44(0.07) 0.79(0.07) 0.79(0.07) 0.78(0.07) 0.75(0.06)
QS o.73(0.0?) o.s8(o.o2) o.s8(o.o2) o.ss(o.o2) o.ss(o.o2)
Qs 0.45(0.03) 0.45(0.03) 0.45(0.03) 0.45(0.03) 0.48(0.03)
Q, 0.87(0.02) o.so(o.o2) o.so(o.o2) o.so(o.o2) o.ss(o.o2)
Q8 0.43(0.03) 0.42(0.03) 0.42(0.03) 0.42(0.03) 0.41(0.03)
Q9 0.48(0.04) 0.48(0.05) 0.48(0.05) 0.48(0.05) 0.48(0.04)
á~ 0.31(0.003) 0.29(0.003) 0.29(0.003) 0.29(0.003) 0.31(0.004)
án 0.29(0.004) 0.30(0.004) 0.30(0.004) 0.29(0.003) 0.29(0.004)
L -3543.6 -3312.2 -3315.3 -3312.5 -3803.0
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FICURE2: AgeFunctions,--b-0,--.1-,~,--~-1,--~b-ë,-b-1.
TABLE V: POVERTY LINES
Household Composition 6- 0 a- a a- 1 b- b b- 1 Statutory
Poverty
Line
1 Adult 14,239 15,310 15,181 15,091 15,489 13,218
2 Adults 18,095 17,415 17,091 17,537 16,387 18,882
2 Adults ~ 6 18,298 18,359 18,017 18,564 16,832 19,963
2 Adults f 12 19,100 18,481 18,070 18,702 16,942 20,233
2 Adults ~- 12,6 19,240 19,199 18,772 19,462 17,337 22,071
2 Adults f 12,6,1 20,575 20,430 19,969 20,788 18,158 23,360
2 Adults f 12,6,2,1 21,222 21,290 20,811 21,681 18,834 24,933
2 Adults f 18,12,6,1 21,996 21,335 20,742 21,723 19,000 28,281
Dfl. per year.
8
household. The statutory poverty line levels end up to be higher than the subjectivepoverty line levels for all selected household compositions, except for the first one, nomatter the specification.
5 Conclusions
If in a questionnaire, the Minimum Income Question is not preceded by detailedquestions on household income to avoid misperception of this income by the head ofthe household when answering the MIQ, the answer should be corrected. Prefacing
the A4IQ with a measure of the perception of household income enables adjustmentin explaining the answer to the MIQ. If one prefers to adjust the answers, it ispossible to estimate the appropriate size of adjustment. Also the measurement ofperceived income may be used more directly in explaining the MIQ answers. Eitherapproach shows that adjustment proportionate to income misperception leads to both
an overestimation of the Subjective Poverty Line for a one-person household and an
overestimation of the economies of scale with an increasing number of household
members.
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